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AN APPROACH TO ADDRESSING EXPLOSIVE RELATED
ACCIDENTS BY IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC TRAINING
Gour C Sen1 and Geoff Downs2
ABSTRACT: In underground coal mines, the use of explosives is very limited, particularly where the longwall
method of mining is practised. However, occasionally the call for the use of explosives does occur in most
underground coal mines. Explosive use today is generally confined to shooting a dyke, excavating an overcast in
stone, for fault drivage, and for shaft sinking or drifting in cases where use of a road header is considered to be
uneconomical. Explosives have also been successfully used in triggering goaf falls to prevent wind-blast or for
remote mining through areas where methane gas does not drain below the ‘outburst threshold limit’ It is therefore
essential that among the mine personnel there are employees qualified in the handling of explosives under varying
conditions, and these qualifications should be up to date.
This paper proposes that all shotfirers should undergo a refresher course in blasting at intervals of five years, so
that up-to-date knowledge is disseminated. The essential modules of such a refresher blasting course should
consist of the following: a) Familiarisation with current types of explosives and accessories; b) Types and modes of
initiation; c) Blast design and calculation; d) Precautions to be taken before and after firing; e) Consideration of
environmental factors; and f) Dealing with misfires. Above all, a safety culture amongst the personnel who handle
explosives needs to be established, and strictly adhered to.
INTRODUCTION
In mining and in civil engineering projects, blasting is one of the most potentially hazardous operations. It is
recorded (Sen & Hayword, 2007) that blasting related accidents have claimed the lives of more than a thousand
people around the world since the turn of the Millennium. Most of these accidents are due to flyrock and an
inadequate blast exclusion zone. A number of recent explosive related accidents will be cited and conclusions
drawn. Explosives manufacturers are continually developing their product, with improved safety characteristics,
and it is fair to comment that most blasting accidents are usually due to human error or ignorance, rather than a
faulty product. The impact of increasing safety and environmental legislation as well as the growing explosives
security requirements demand that blasting operations should be managed by shot-firers who are competent in all
facets of explosives usage. This is particularly pertinent to those shot-firers who get sporadic, often very infrequent
calls to undertake blasting operations.
Many European countries (Akhavan et al, 2007) are endeavouring to review explosives regulations and realise that
training with respect to the management of blasts needs to be improved. Apart from primary risk associated with
the storage, transport and handling of explosives, there are possible operational risks due to flyrock or misfires
caused by poor blast design. The major shift is to train the blasting crews so that the new training scheme prepares
them for competence-based, rather than knowledge based qualifications.
This paper firstly deals with some explosives related incidents and analyses their causes. This will be followed by
instructions in line with the directives of the Australian Forum of Explosives Regulators – a body seeking to
harmonise explosives regulation throughout Australia – training with respect to the management of blasts needs to
be improved.
EXPLOSIVES RELATED INCIDENTS
Numerous explosives related accidents have occurred, and it is not possible to mention or analyse them here. This
paper will endeavour to focus on certain incidents from which conclusions can be drawn.
Porgera Gold Mine, Papua New Guinea Explosion
This explosion totally destroyed the explosives manufacturing facility on the surface in August 1994 with the loss of
11 personnel (Sen and Abrahams, 2005). There were two explosions, about 1 hour 15 minutes apart. The fires on
the bulk truck around and underneath the bulk emulsion and process oil tanks subsequently caused the second
explosion, which was larger than the previous one. It is estimated that approximately 5½ tonnes of various types of
explosives were destroyed during the first explosion, creating a crater of 7 x 5 x 2 m. The second explosion
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produced a crater of approx. 40m in diameter and 15m deep, with the destruction of nearly 90 tonnes of
explosives.
After extensive analytical work, it was found that the first explosion occurred in the emulsion explosives packaging
line, specifically within the Mono pump. Although the exact mechanism of the initiation of the explosion is not
known, it is believed that the initiation point for the first explosion took place inside the rotor boss-head cavity,
where the emulsion explosives compound managed to leach pass O-rings and a possibly missing packing gland
over a period of time. It is thought that microscopic cracks, flexing of components, heat and possibly back pressure
were sufficient to create the right conditions to initiate the explosive compound in the cavity. Some emulsion
explosives exhibit strong exothermic reaction above 230° C.
A planned inspection programme covering critical plant and equipment, parts and items could have avoided this
massive destruction.
Incident during demolition of buildings, Canberra, Australia
This incident happened in July 1997 in the course of the demolition of a tower block constructed of reinforced
concrete with steel columns. The building, to be demolished by implosion, was situated on the edge of a lake. An
estimated 30, – 40,000 spectators were gathered around the lake on the far side of the building. A young girl, who
was standing about 430 m from the explosion site watching the demolition, was hit by a flying projectile and died
instantly. Her death was caused by a fragment of steel expelled from one of the corner columns of the building.
This steel projectile, which weighed nearly 1 kg, struck the girl’s head. This impact caused the girl’s scalp and
skullcap to sever from her head.
-1
The impact velocity of the steel fragment was estimated to be 128 – 130 m , with an associated energy of around
8.172 kJ. A piece of fractured steel from another backing plate was embedded in the grounds of a house about 400
m from the blast site. The plate was warm to the touch. Other metal debris, recovered from the surrounding area
after the blast showed the same qualitative characteristics that generally occur when steel is intimately exposed to
a sudden explosive impact.

Subsequent enquiry revealed that there were a large number of weaknesses in executing the project, the
prominent ones being: a) the blasting contractor did not have sufficient experience in imploding a large building; b)
there was a lack of pre-weakening of some pertinent structure of the building; c) the quantities of explosives used
were clearly excessive; d) the protective measures were inadequate; e) there was an inappropriate exclusion zone
to ensure the safety of the crowd and f) the height of the bund erected for containing projectiles was insufficient.
Truck explosion, Hunter Valley, Australia
A utility truck, used for carrying explosives in a open cut coal mine, exploded in February 2003. After loading 97
holes with boosters and detonators for the blast of the day there remained a surplus of one box containing 23
detonators, two full boxes of boosters and one box containing 38 boosters. The detonator box and the partly filled
booster box were placed at the rear right of the truck, and two full booster boxes on left side of the tray.
The shotfirer then had liquid refreshment and smoke, after which he went to the ‘crib hut’ and took a packet of
cigarettes and placed it in the cabin of the truck. Then he drove the vehicle to the magazine gate, which he stopped
to open. After getting out of the truck, the shotfirer noticed smoke coming from the driver’s side of the rear tray. He
ran to the passenger side at the front of the truck and crouched down, when the vehicle exploded. The shotfirer
was hit by flying gravel and knocked over, clear of the moving truck.
The locked gate restricted forward movement of the truck, but was smashed open by the post-exploded vehicle.
The dazed shotfirer regained his feet and wandered around the compound in the direction of the ‘crib hut’.
Subsequently he was found lying on the ground outside the hut.
The injured shotfirer was taken to the hospital to be examined, but apart from small cuts, abrasions, bruises to
arms and legs he was not seriously injured. The shotfirer must have been shielded from the explosive force by the
cabin, and his injuries were caused by the shock waves from under the truck. Eardrum damage would have
normally occurred within 15m of the explosion and although he was actually within a 10m limit, because of the
shielding effect of his actual position, he sustained no increased injuries. If the shotfirer had been in a standing
position in front of the truck, the windscreen would have decapitated him.
It was clear that the cause of the whole incident was that the shotfirer flicked a burning cigarette out of his window
whilst driving, and it landed on a detonator box. The movement of the air over the cigarette caused the box to
ignite, which in turn ignited the foil and finally the detonators. The detonators then set off the open box of boosters,
which in turn set off two unopened boxes of boosters almost immediately.
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Some snapshots of incidents around the World (Anon)
Unplanned detonation of seismic detonators, South America
This incident, involving electric seismic detonators, occurred in South America and resulted in the death of one
operator and the amazing survival of another. The survivor has been able to give a complete description of the
events leading up to the accident. From this it has been possible to eliminate the obvious causes, such as radios
and batteries etc.
The essential details are that a primer charge of Pentolite was being prepared by taping the wires of the detonators
to the outside of the charge, when it detonated. The primer charge was a typical plastic seismic cartridge, and two
cartridges were joined together, each with a detonator in the detonator well. The detonator leads were shorted and
the bared wires insulated. The weather was about 20° C and not particularly conducive to static generation. The
operator was wearing light clothing and was kneeling on a wooden platform taping up the primer when it exploded.
The opinion is that an electrostatic discharge must have caused the incident. Technically, the plastic tape being
unwound generated a voltage, so that a charge was induced on the detonator. It is postulated that a spark
occurred between the shell of the detonator and the fusehead assembly and leadwires.
Explosion while burning empty explosive boxes
After loading a face of a quarry with explosives and initiating devices, a shot-firer collected the empty boxes ready
for disposal by burning, and liberally sprinkled diesel fuel to aid combustion. As it was a cold day, he decided to
warm himself by the fire. Suddenly there was an explosion, and the man was fatally injured by the blast.
The subsequent investigation revealed that during the shot loading operation, someone had placed an off-cut of
heavy duty detonating cord into one of the boxes for later disposal and failed to warn anyone of this fact. The
burning of the empty cases, aided by the diesel oil, led to the explosion of the detonating cord. Further, the shotfirer
had been standing too close to the fire. Had the shotfirer obeyed basic rules for burning discarded explosives
packaging, this accident could have been avoided.
Lightning initiated an explosion in a surface mine, Australia
In 1968 lightning hit a totally non-electric blasting work area in a surface mine in Western Australia. All the
blastholes were loaded and were to be initiated with detonating cord downlines and mainlines, and then to be fired
with a capped safety fuse.
A rain-storm with associated lightning moved into the area. Because it was hot, the blast crew decided to stay out
in the rain to cool off and continued to charge the holes with gelignite. The reel of detonating cord was located on a
vertical stake at one end of the blast site. Downlines for each hole were cut off this reel as the blast-crew moved
along the row, and eventually the detonating cord lay over the tops of a number of charged holes.
The lightning got close and finally hit the blast site, when the gelignite detonated. This initiated the detonating cord
back to the reel, which promptly exploded violently. The two men who were charging were killed. Random holes
along the face were initiated where the cord lay over the ends of the downlines.
Safe practice dictates that all shot firing operations should cease in the vicinity of an electrical storm. Moreover, a
mainline detonating cord should never be casually run over the downlines. The reel should be taken to each hole
and then cut leaving an adequate length secured at the collar. When all the holes are charged, only then is the reel
run out to form a mainline. This practice minimises the time that the mainline cord is actually connected to the
holes.
Explosion in a truck carrying detonators, China
A truck carrying 285,000 blasting caps exploded in the southwest city of Chongqing, killing 14 persons and injuring
48. Explosions from this blast lasted almost half an hour, blowing out windows in a 50m radius. The driver of the
truck and a passenger were killed, while other victims were nearby pedestrians.
It is suspected that a burning cigarette came in contact with the cardboard detonator box, which caused a small
fire, followed by the explosion.
Explosion in an underwater blasting operation, Newcastle, Australia, 1978 (Apel, 2005)
The aim of this blasting operation was to deepen the harbour channel to allow larger vessels to berth. The work
involved drilling and blasting from a barge where the water depth was between 15 to 20 m. Nitroglycerine based
explosives (AN60) with detonating cord were used. Occasionally, drilling rods were used as a tamping rod to push
the explosive cartridges into the blasthole.
One day, two lengths of drilling rods were being mechanically joined on the barge surface and caused an explosion
in which two workmen were killed.
Subsequent investigation revealed the cause of the accident. Since drilling rods were used to tamp the explosive
cartridges, some parts of the explosive cartridge accumulated in the rod threads as well as in the hollow section of
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the rods. This explosive residue was not visible, as the rods were partially covered with mud. The pressure created
by the mechanical joining of the rods initiated the explosion.
This is a salutary example of the consequences of using an inappropriate tool.
Incidents with trucks carrying explosives, Spain
Two incidents are quoted here. The first one happened in Castellon, Spain, when a lorry carrying ammonium
nitrate collided head-on with two cars, killing two persons and injuring three. The damaged heavy goods vehicle
overturned and left the road. The diesel fuel from the broken tank came in contact with the load of ammonium
nitrate, which initiated an explosion half an hour after the vehicle overturned. The resulting explosion could be
heard in villages more than 15 kilometres away. The lorry was totally destroyed, leaving a crater several metres
across. The fireballs generated travelled for a radius of up to one kilometre around the area of the accident, leading
to 15 small fires. After this accident, the Special Risk Plan for the Carriage of Dangerous Goods was introduced.
Drilling into a charged hole, Denmark, 1995
Two men had been drilling in a rock excavation operation. After drilling a few holes and charging them with nitroglycerine based explosives with electric detonators, they found the remainder of a previous blasthole, which is
often termed a ‘butt’. They started drilling into this ‘butt’ until an explosion occurred, which injured both men.
Subsequent investigation concluded that the men were drilling into un-detonated explosives. Fortunately, the firing
circuit with all charged blastholes had not been joined. Of greater concern is that neither of the men had attended a
blasting course and that they were using a 12V battery to initiate the shot.
Explosives truck blown up by candles, China, 1996
A truck carrying one tonne of explosives, 5,000 detonators and 500 metres of detonating cord blew up in Sichuan
Province. The explosives were accidentally ignited by workers when they lit candles to provide light while unloading
the truck.
At least 14 people were killed, more than 30 seriously injured and an unknown number of people missing. All
houses were totally destroyed within a radius of 100 metres of the blast, which occurred in an agricultural
machinery station in Yunyang County, Sichuan Province.
Premature explosion of detonating cord reel
At a large open pit operation, low energy cord was being used to link-up down lines of standard cord protruding
from blastholes. The surface lines were deployed from off the reel from the back of a moving truck when suddenly
one of the lines become snagged and snapped. There was an explosion and the remaining detonating cord in the
reel exploded into the back of the truck, seriously injuring the operators.
At the enquiry following this accident, it was concluded that the practice of unreeling the detonating cord from a
moving truck had the potential to cause a serious accident if the cord becomes entangled or snagged. When this
occurs, tension and friction created at the surface connection, when used, is believed to heat the priming element
making it much more sensitive to initiation by friction or shock. Premature detonation can occur when the cord is
under tension.
Collision of a truck loaded with ANFO, Mexico, 2007 (Abrahams, 2007)
A truck, loaded with 25 tonnes of ANFO, crashed into a pickup on a two-lane highway, and then burst into flame. It
took about ¾ of an hour for the cargo to explode after the accident, and created a huge hole in the road. This
accident took place near a small farming village and an aquatic recreation centre packed with families on weekend
outings. The questions arose about why authorities did not evacuate the scene.
The chief of police investigations in Monclova, a steel city a few miles from the accident site, said the driver of the
truck and a co-driver had survived the explosion and were wanted for questioning.
STRATEGIC TRAINING PROGRAM
Introduction
This section describes the Queensland Explosives Inspectorate approach to managing explosives’ safety and
security, shotfirer licensing, and reviews the proposed directions of the Australian Forum of Explosives Regulators,
the work of Skills DMC: National Industry Skills Council in developing uniform national shotfirer competencies. It
evaluates the need for skills maintenance of shotfirer competencies and a general evaluation of training and
competencies of others in the explosives’ life cycle.
Explosives are an essential tool to the mining and some other industries. The management and control of
explosives in its life cycle is essential to the health, safety, security and well being of all those involved in its
lifecycle. The lifecycle includes all those activities involved in the import, export, sale, use, transport, storage,
manufacture and disposal of explosives. These activities are generally licensed under explosives legislation. On a
mine site, the people with a role in explosives and blasting may include -

254

14 - 15 February 2008

2008 Coal Operators’ Conference

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The AusIMM Illawarra Branch

Drill and blast superintendent;
Blast designer;
Driller;
Blasting contractor;
Shotfirer;
Shotfirer assistants;
Magazine keeper;
Vehicle drivers;
Transporters; and
Explosives manufacturers including mobile manufacturing units and ANFO blow loaders. Of these people,
the shotfirer is one of the few people who must have mandatory competencies for an accompanying
licence or equivalent.

Queensland Explosives Inspectorate Approach
The Queensland Explosives Inspectorate administers the Explosives Act 1999 and Explosives Regulation 2003.
The approach of the inspectorate is governed by the legislation and the vision and mission. The vision of the
inspectorate is Our community safe and secure from explosives and the mission is To protect our community from
the adverse impact of explosives.
The approach of the Explosives Inspectorate is based on the approach of Professor James Reason and the Swiss
Cheese Model and is summarised in Figure1.

Queensland Explosives Inspectorate
Strategies for explosives incident prevention and
risk minimisation

Competent Inspectorate
Consultation / Awareness

Explosives
Activities

Effective Legislation
Appropriate Standards / Codes

‘REASONABLE’
SAFETY IN THE
EXPLOSIVES
INDUSTRY

Competent Industry
Effective Licensing Processes
Product Safety / Quality

Government Explosives Reserves
Inspections / Audits
Compliance / Enforcement
Investigations
Education/Training/Advice
Emergency Response Capability

EXPLOSIVES INCIDENTS
Figure 1 - Queensland Explosives Inspectorate Strategies for explosives incident
prevention and risk minimisation
Briefly, in the “Swiss Cheese” model, a series of barriers and defences are put in place to prevent incidents. Each
barrier and defence is not entirely 100% effective and hence there is an opening in that barrier and defence and
hence the hole. The hole may open and close due to the changing circumstances altering its effectiveness. The
more barriers and defences that are effective are put in place, the more reliable and effective the strategy and
system will be. When the holes in the “Swiss Cheese” line up, an incident will occur.
From Figure 1, a competent industry together with suitable education and training are important barriers and
defences in the strategy to prevent explosives incidents and minimise risk. Effective training and competencies are
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essential strategies. Training is a combination of formal training and on-the-job training. A similar type of model
could be developed by a workplace for the development of their own strategies to prevent accidents and minimise
risk.
Shotfirers
Now specifically looking at shotfirers in Queensland, a shotfirer for underground or above ground coal activities
must be licensed under the Explosives Act 1999 or appointed as a shotfirer by the Site senior Executive under the
Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999. A shotfirer licence is issued for a one or five year period. For a new
shotfirer licence to be issued or renewed, a current Statement of Attainment from an accredited Registered
Training Organisation (RTO) under the Australian Quality Training Framework (AQTF) must be provided with the
application. The Statement of Attainment must be dated within the last three years and must have the required
national competency units from a national training package. Table 1 in the Appendix is used by the Queensland
Explosives Inspectorate to determine if the requisite competencies from the agricultural, metalliferous, construction
industry, quarry or coal packages have been obtained. The columns in Table 1 provide a list of alternative
competencies that can be obtained to achieve the desired category of licence, Category 1 being agricultural,
seismic and small scale blasting, Category 2 is quarrying, open cut and construction and Category 3 is tunnelling
and underground mining. As seen from the table, the selection of competencies is quite complex considering the
competencies options from the agricultural, metalliferous, quarry or coal packages, which have equivalent
competencies.
The origins of the current blasting competencies are set within a number of nationally accredited training packages
under the Australian Quality Training Framework. These training packages can be found on the National Training
Information Service (NTIS) website www.ntis.gov.au. These include military, transport, coal mining, quarrying,
metalliferous mining, civil construction and agricultural training packages. For blasting, the three nationally
accredited mining training packages referred above each contain units, which outline competency requirements for
topics from magazine keeping to blast design.
Skills DMC: National Industry Skills Council
Currently the Skills DMC: National Industry Skills Council is managing a consolidation project aimed at rationalising
duplication of similar competency units within several closely allied training packages. The common units should
be released in late 2008, for use in metalliferous and coal mining, quarrying and construction industries. The
proposed consolidation of the shotfiring units will simplify the complexity of competencies across the three
nationally accredited mining training packages and this work has been the subject of consultation and review with
stakeholders from government, industry and the unions who are in agreement with the proposed changes. The
Skills DMC: National Industry Skills Council has kept the members of the Australian Forum of Explosives
Regulators (AFER) briefed on the progress and development of the work.
Skills DMC: National Industry Skills Council is a national organisation with the primary role of facilitating the
Vocational and Education Training needs of all stakeholders within the Coal, Civil Construction, Construction
Materials, Drilling and Metalliferous industry sectors.
Australian Forum of Explosives Regulators
In addition to the consolidation of the shotfirer units by the Skills DMC: National Industry Skills Council, all States
explosives regulators who are representatives at Australian Forum of Explosives Regulators (AFER) have agreed
to adopt and transition towards using these nationally accredited competency units as a basis for their respective
shotfirer licensing regimes.
Through the activities of the AFER, all States explosives regulators have also committed to consistent licensing
and licensing criteria for all explosives related activities including shotfirers. Not only has it been agreed, but it is
currently under active review. All States explosives regulators have agreed to adopt the national competencies as
the basis for licensing.
To date, there has not been discussion or agreement at AFER regarding the refreshing of competencies at regular
intervals e.g. every five years.
National competencies for shotfirers have existed for many years now. Not all jurisdictions require evidence of the
national competencies for licensing purposes. Even though this position exists, all jurisdictions at AFER have
committed to their adoption.
The AFER is the forum of government authorities responsible for administering explosives safety and security
legislation in Australia. The AFER reports to the Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council (WRMC) on the
development of nationally consistent explosives regulation, through the Australian Safety and Compensation
Council (ASCC). Membership of AFER consists of two representatives from each Australian state and territory,
Australian Government including Defence, Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), and Australian Maritime Safety
Authority (AMSA).
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AFER’s terms of reference include but are not limited to:
•
•

acting as the lead body to provide recommendations to governments through the WRMC
on nationally consistent explosives regulation;
promote the development and implementation of nationally consistent legislation and safety and
security standards to Ministers, heads of agencies and associated parties.

Maintenance of competencies
In Queensland, a person applying for a new or renewed shotfirer licence must provide a Statement of Attainment
dated within the last three years for the required national competencies provided by an approved Registered
Training Organisation. This position is at variance with the State and Territory bodies administering the AQTF.
Their assertion is that a person who is deemed competent will remain competent and that competency does not
expire.
The approach of ensuring that a Statement of attainment is dated within a certain period of time e.g. three or five
years was introduced in the Explosives Regulation 2003 in Queensland. A review of training and competencies
was undertaken as a part of the investigation into the fireworks tragedy at Bray Park Brisbane in May 2000.
Franklin (Franklin 2001) in his Training and Competencies Report recommended that a program should be
developed that states requirements for skills maintenance of all licence holders to the initial standards. Franklin
(Franklin 2001) also recommended that legislation must be developed that requires both formal and on-the-job
training as an initial licensing requirement, and on-going refresher training as a condition of licence holding.
It is recognised that fireworks operators had similarities to underground coal shotfirers to the extent that they
conduct their explosives activities on an infrequent basis.
In addition, from reviewing explosive incidents and complaints undertaken by the Queensland Explosives
Inspectorate, the knowledge and skills of shotfirers has been contributing factors. Within the last 15 years, there
have been great changes in most areas within the explosives life cycle. There had been the implementation and
adoption of new legislation, Explosives Act 1999 and Explosives Regulation 2003, changes for control and security
of security sensitive ammonium nitrate, new and updated Australian Standards AS2187 Parts 1 and 2 for the
storage and use of explosives, new code for the transport of explosives by road and rail, new industry codes for the
explosives precursors, mobile processing plants and hot and reactive grounds. The Explosives Act 1999, like the
Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 is performance based adopting a risk management approach to the
management of health and safety.
During these periods, technology has advanced with the implementation of new initiation systems, explosives
companies introducing changed products including safer explosives and with the growth of the industry, shots are
being larger. With these changes have also come new challenges such as hot and reactive ground in areas where
they were unknown for the new products being used. In general, there was considerable change. This has driven
the mechanism to be in place for the shotfirer to upgrade their skills. This mechanism is the refreshing of the
competencies though possessing a current Statement of Attainment. The issue date should be within the last three
years.
During this period, the world security crisis has resulted in the upgraded focus on security of explosives,
ammonium nitrate and explosives precursors and the appropriateness of people having supervised and
unsupervised access.
In addition to these technical changes, the mining industries are facing huge challenges with skill shortages, high
staff turnover rates and loss of corporate memory. In the Australian Mining Journal Nov/Dec 2005, the Newcrest
Managing Director reported that 41% of the employees of that company had been with the company for less than
one year.
All shotfirers must have and maintain a desirable level of competence. To achieve this, shotfirers must be initially
well trained. There is sufficient data (Franklin 2001) to suggest this can be achieved in a structured training
course, which includes sufficient task skills development. There is also sufficient evidence (Franklin 2001) to
suggest this is more likely to occur in a formal training environment than by potentially ad hoc on-the-job training.
Data (Franklin 2001) has shown that initial competence can be lost over time and/or replaced with alternative
approaches. This indicates that competency can be lost over time. One explanation is the loss of theoretical
knowledge in relation to safety matters. Other explanations are that practical skills were never gained, such as
with limited practical training or were lost by lack of use due to limited numbers of blasts. A combination of the two
approaches is another obvious explanation.
Under legislation, a person must be trained and competent for the role and tasks that they will be undertaking. In
addition to the identification of formal training needs, all workplaces managing explosives must develop operate
and maintain a safety management system and security plans. These activities require, in addition to formal
training to national competencies, on the job training and for this training to be refreshed.
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There is a combination of formal training and on the job training for all jobs. The greater the reliance and use of
national competencies is well recognised and supported. The relative timing of formal training and on-the-job
requirement is important.
The essential modules of such a refresher blasting course should consist of the following :
•
•
•
•
•
•

Familiarisation with current types of explosives and accessories;
Types and modes of initiation;
Blast design and calculation;
Precautions to be taken before and after firing; and
Consideration of environmental factors; and
Dealing with misfires.

This is essentially renewing the national competency which can be done by a combination of course work and
recognition of prior learning. The addition of reviewing accidents and incidents such as those identified earlier in
this paper would be most useful.
As seen above, national competencies exist for shotfirers and these are being rationalised by the Skills DMC:
National Industry Skills Council. It is also noticed that not all states explosives regulators require that shotfirers
must be competent under these national competencies. Because shotfirers must hold licences or equivalents
based on these competencies in Queensland, there are eight Registered Training Organisations in Queensland
approved to deliver training and refresher for shotfirers to these national mining competencies covering explosives.
This training covers shotfirers, assistant shotfirers and magazine keepers. This is a very effective and satisfactory
outcome.
European developments
A recent paper (Akhavan et al, 2007) describes developments in the European Qualification for Workers in the
Explosives Sector. Over the past three years, the UK, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Italy have taken part in a
program under the EU funded Leonardo Da Vinci program. The UK has developed National Occupational
Standards for the civil and defence sectors. The National Vocational Qualifications define the knowledge and skills
and how these form the basis of vocational education. Currently there are 440 National Occupational Standards
and competencies, 24 National Vocational Qualifications within 12 key roles. These can be found on
http://www.qca.org.uk/610.html under explosives substance and articles. People have the ability to subscribe to
some of these competencies over the web for a fee.
CONCLUSION
The developments in consolidating and rationalising the current blasting competencies by the Skills DMC: National
Industry Skills Council is positive step forward for the training and competencies of shotfirers.
The commitment of the state explosives regulators to move to adopt these competencies for licensing is a positive
step forward together with the step toward consistent licensing and licensing criteria.
The maintenance of the knowledge and skills of shotfirers should be refreshed at a minimum of every 5 years and
this should be done through the maintaining of the national competency standard. This follows a period of rapid
change in technology, legislation, standards, codes and security awareness.
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Competency Units
MNMG 352A - Apply Blasting Activities #;
(or QEC110, 111, 112, 113, 114)

The AusIMM Illawarra Branch

Training
Package
MNM 05
(or
39023QLD)

Category 1

Category 2

Category 3

Agricultural, Seismic, Small
Scale Blasting

Quarrying, Open
cut (metalliferous
and coal),
Construction

Tunnelling
and
underground
mining

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

x

X

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

RTD02

x

RTD 3710A - Identify and Select
Explosives

RTD02

x

RTD 3711A - Prepare and Use explosives

RTD02

x

MNMG 313A - Charge Blast Holes (UG)*;
(or MNMG 321A & MNMG 323A)

MNM 05

X

x

MNMG 412A - Initiate blasts (UG)

MNM 05

X

x

MNMG 353A - Fire Surface Blasts

MNM 05

MNMG 210A - Store, handle and
transport explosives

MNM 05

MNMG 311A - Conduct secondary
blasting

MNM 05

MNMG 349 - Conduct accretion firing

MNM 05

MNQOPS 313A – Handle and transport
explosives** (or MNMG 210A)

MNQ03
(or MNM
05)

x

MNQOPS 413A - Conduct Shotfiring

MNQ03

x

MNCO 1040A - Conduct Shotfiring
operations

MNC04

MNCU 1048A - Conduct Shotfiring (UG)

MNC04

x

Metalliferous

x
x

x

x
x
Quarry

x
x
1,5

2,6

2,5

2,3

2,4

2,5

2,5

2,5

2,6,7

Coal

Conditions

Agricultural

RTD 3709A - Handle and Store
Explosives

Metalliferous

2,8

APPENDIX - Table 1 – Shotfirer Competency Requirements – Queensland December 2007
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